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THE LEGAL PROFESSION: CLIENT 
INTERESTS, PROFESSIONAL ROLES, 
AND SOCIAL HIERARCHIES 
John P. Heinz* and Edward 0. Laumann**t 
There is a natural urge to study the extreme. The extreme case is 
likely to be conspicuous and dramatic. Sociological research on the 
American legal profession has not, for the most part, resisted the 
urge. 1 The best-known studies examine lawyers at the extremes of 
the profession's prestige hierarchy-e.g., Carlin's study of solo prac-
titioners and Smigel's study of the Wall Street lawyer.2 The profes-
sion's center has more often been neglected and few data are 
available on the bar's overall social structure. Ladinsky's study .of 
Detroit lawyers3 covers all types and specialities, and contributes 
* Professor of Law, Northwestern University. A.B. 1958, Washington University; LL.B. 
1962, Yale University.-Ed. 
** Professor of Sociology and Director, Center for Social Organization Studies, University 
of Chicago. A.B. 1960, Oberlin College; Ph.D. 1964, Harvard University.-Ed. 
t An earlier version of this paper was presented at the 1978 Annual Meeting of the South-
ern Sociological Society. New Orleans, March 30, 1978. This study has been conducted under 
the sponsorship of the American Bar Foundation, with funding provided by the American Bar 
Endowment, the Russell Sage Foundation, and the National Science Foundation (SOC 77-
24699). The authors have received valuable advice from more than a score of members of the 
Chicago bar, as well as from many colleagues at Northwestern University and The University 
of Chicago. Particularly important contributions to the material presented in this Article were 
made by James Rahl, Daniel Polsby, Francis Spalding, Stephen Presser, Spencer Kimball and 
Morris Janowitz. Especially helpful in the technical aspects of the data analysis were the au-
thors' research assistants, Charles Cappell, Scott Marden, and Michael Powell. The authors 
wish to acknowledge, with gratitude, their considerable debts to all of these persons and insti-
tutions. 
I. In addition to this tendency, sociological research on lawyers is, overall, a bit sparse 
compared to that on doctors. See, e.g., E. FRIEDSON, PROFESSIONAL DOMINANCE: THE SO-
CIAL STRUCTURE OF MEDICAL CARE (1971), and the literature cited at note 34 1i?fra. More-
over, many of the major studies are now rather dated. For example, the well-known work of 
Jerome Carlin, Jack Ladinsky, and Erwin Smigel, cited in the next two footnotes, is all at least 
ten years old. More recently, sociological interest in the legal profession has begun to grow. 
See D. RUESCHEMEYER, LAWYERS AND THEIR SOCIETY (1973); D. ROSENTHAL, LAWYER AND 
CLIENT: WHO'S IN CHARGE? (1974); J. HANDLER, E. HOLLINGSWORTH & H. ERLANGER, LAW-
YERS AND THE PURSUIT OF LEGAL RIGHTS (1978). See also, A. BLAUSTEIN & C. PORTER, THE 
AMERICAN LAWYER (1954); H. O'GORMAN, LAWYERS AND MATRIMONIAL CASES (1963); S. 
WARKOV &J. ZELAN, LAWYERS IN THE MAKING (1965); J. CARLIN, LAWYERS' ETHICS (1966); 
J. HANDLER, THE LAWYER AND HIS COMMUNITY (1967); A. WOOD, THE CRIMINAL LAWYER 
(1967); Q. JOHNSTONE & D. HOPSON, LAWYERS AND THEIR WORK (1967); H. Ross, SETTLED 
OUT OF COURT (1971); Stevens, Law Schools and Law Students, 59 VA. L. REV. 551 (1973). 
2. J. CARLIN, LAWYERS ON THEIR OWN (1962); E. SMIGEL, THE WALL STREET LAWYER 
(1969). 
3. Ladinsky, The Social Profile of a Metropolitan Bar: A Statistical Survey in Detroit, MICH. 
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substantially to our understanding of the profession's general social 
structure, but it rests on a limited data base. Rueschemeyer's com-
mentary on the legal profession has a broader, comparative view-
point and includes useful theoretical propositions, but it presents no 
original data on American lawyers.4 
This Article attempts to supply some of that data by systemati-
cally describing and analyzing the social structure of the legal pro-
fession in a major city. The Article first describes the types of 
differentiation that might be expected within the profession, and 
then examines the extent to which those differences in fact occur 
within the Chicago bar. It concludes that the most important deter-
minant of the profession's social organization is the impact on the 
bar of client interests rather than of forces generated within the pro-
fession or compelled by the logic of the law. Finally, the Article 
compares law with medicine to demonstrate why the characteristics 
of the persons served more significantly determine the profession's 
structure in law than in medicine. 
We present data on a large random sample drawn from the full 
range and variety of the legal profession in a major American city. 
The sample appears to be a reasonably representative cross section 
of the population. 5 As part of a larger study of the legal profession 
and the organized bar,6 our staff personally interviewed 777 lawyers 
with offices in the city of Chicago7 and gathered information about 
the nature of the respondents' legal practice and clients, the respon-
ST. B.J., Feb. 1964, at 12. See also Ladinsky, Careers of Lawyers, Low Practice and Legal 
Institutions, 28 AM. Soc. REV. 47 (1963); Ladinsky, The Impact of Social Backgrounds of Law-
yers on Low Practice and the Low, 16 J. LEGAL Eouc. 127 (1963). 
4. D. RUESCHEMEYER, supra note 1. 
5. We defined the population universe to include all lawyers with office addresses within 
the city limits of Chicago, as listed in either Sullivan's Low J)irectory far the State of Illinois, 
1974-75 or Martindale-Hubbell Low J)irecto,y, 1974. We used two directories to increase the 
coverage and to avoid biases of individual directories. (These procedures would not, of course, 
eliminate biases that the directories may share.) We then drew a true random sample from 
these lists. Our 777 completed interviews represent 82.1 % of our original target sample. Only 
8.4% explicitly refused to grant an interview; we missed the remaining 9.5% due to the subject's 
illness, time constraints, scheduling problems, and the like. An examination of the known 
characteristics of those lawyers we failed to include, for whatever reasons, suggests that we 
may slightly underenumerate nonmembers of the Chicago Bar Association and lawyers en-
gaged in solo practice, especially those who maintain only accommodation addresses in the 
city. This underenumeration, however, is sufficiently small that for most purposes we can treat 
the completed sample as representative of the defined population universe. 
6. Heinz, Laumann, Cappell, Halliday, & Schaalman, J)iversity, Representation, and Lead-
ership in on Urban JJor: A First Report on a Survey of the Chicago JJor, 1976 AM. B. FoUNDA· 
TI0N RESEARCH J. 717 (hereinafter cited as First Report]. 
7. The interviews were conducted in the spring and summer of 1975, averaged sixty-six 
minutes in length, and were almost always conducted at the respondent's place of work during 
regular business hours. 
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dents' personal and social characteristics, their attitudes toward ma-
jor social and legal issues, and their membership and participation in 
the various bar associations. 
l. DIFFERENTIATION OF THE LEGAL PROFESSION: THE 
VARIABLES 
The fields of law differ in their substantive doctrines, in their 
characteristic tasks, in the settings in which the fields are practiced, 
and in the social origins of their practitioners. But we hypothesize 
that these differences are secondary to yet another variable: the type 
of client served. We suggest that differences between clients pro-
foundly influence many of the other types of differentiation among 
the fields-that the legal profession is, to a great degree, externally 
oriented, and in consequence is shaped and structured by its clients. 
Many of the recognized fields oflaw correspond to bodies of doc-
trine generally regarded as distinct legal subjects and taught as sepa-
rate courses in law school-e.g., crimes, real estate, commercial 
transactions, personal injury, tax, labor, corporations, antitrust, and 
securities. 8 But the practicing bar commonly distinguishes between 
two sides of many of these doctrinal areas, sides that serve adverse 
clients-e.g., criminal defense versus prosecution, personal-injury 
plaintiffs' work versus personal-injury defense, labor law on the 
union side versus the management side, and so on. Other fields di-
vide into parts that, though not necessarily adverse, are nonetheless 
distinct. Corporate tax planning differs from personal income tax 
work, real estate development work from home-mortgage prepara-
tion and title searching, and corporate litigation from a "general 
trial" practice that may encompass bits of divorce, commercial, per-
sonal-injury or even criminal work. As these examples make clear, 
lawyers are accustomed to think in terms of categories of work that 
distinguish, within broader doctrinal areas, fields or sub-fields de-
fined by the types of clients served.9 One of the objectives of our 
8. In another paper, we have discussed the organization of lawyers' work into various 
fields of practice, and we will not reiterate that discussion here. E. Laumann & J. Heinz, 
Fields of Law Practice: Volume of Professional Activity, Intensity of Specialization and Pat-
terns of Co-Practice in a Major Urban Bar (1978) (an unpublished paper read at the Annual 
Meeting of the American Sociological Association in 1978) (hereinafter cited as E. Laumann & 
J. Heinz). 
9. Indeed, the type of client may even determine in good measure the recognized doctrinal 
categories. And doctrinal areas with no corresponding type of client-constitutional law, for 
example-may not produce any distinct specialty or field of practice. By noting that the fields 
of practice often correspond to courses taught in law school, we do not intend to imply that the 
treatment of a subject as a unit of law school instruction establishes that it is proper to regard 
that subject as a coherent body of doctrine, analytically severable from other bodies of legal 
1114 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 76:1111 
research, therefore, was to ascertain the extent to which the opera-
tional definitions of the customary categories of legal work-which 
may, themselves, influence the structure of the profession-are de-
termined by corresponding categories of client-types rather than by 
doctrinal categories or other systematic theory. 
The needs of a particular client or type of client often dictate the 
character and the diversity or homogeneity of the work of a lawyer 
or a law firm. The practitioner who serves a neighborhood's small 
businesses will often also handle the personal income tax returns of 
the owners of those businesses, will file their divorces, and will settle 
their automobile accident claims. The large firm that deals with a 
corporation's antitrust problems is also likely to handle its real estate 
acquisitions, its securities issues, and its corporate tax returns. But a 
lawyer who represents labor unions in one case is unlikely to repre-
sent management in another, and in this country a lawyer may not 
both prosecute and defend criminal cases simultaneously (though 
many young prosecutors later become defense lawyers). Broadly, 
the tendency of lawyers' work to address congeries of problems asso-
ciated with particular types of clients organizes the profession into 
types of lawyers: those serving corporations, and those serving indi-
viduals and individuals' small businesses. Fields within each of 
these broad sectors of the legal profession have more in com-
mon-on a whole range of social variables-than do fields from dif-
ferent sectors. 
The referral systems through which lawyers find clients or clients 
find lawyers may also structure the relationships among the fields of 
law. Patent lawyers, for example, may maintain close ties with coun-
sel for corporations likely to invent patentable products, and lawyers 
specializing in commercial litigation may seek contact with office 
lawyers who represent commercial enterprises, while criminal de-
fense lawyers may cultivate court clerks or prison wardens. The 
shared interest of lawyers and clients in an uninterrupted supply of 
each other creates mechanisms to insure this supply, and these 
mechanisms tend to bring together otherwise disparate fields of law, 
as the examples demonstrate. By contrast, other types of law-
yers-criminal prosecutors, for example-may not need to seek cli-
ents, and this deprives those fields of one incentive for decreasing 
their social isolation from professional colleagues in other fields of 
practice. 
theory. Law schools may well organize their curricula in response to demand, which may in 
tum be structured by client-type. 
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Similarly, referral networks among graduates of particular law 
schools may bind together some fields and separate others. To the 
extent that practitioners of the most elite forms of corporate law 
graduated from the same few law schools, while personal injury or 
criminal lawyers studied at less prestigious, "local" law schools, "old 
school tie" networks may lengthen the social distance10 between 
these types of practice. This phenomenon is part of a more general 
tendency toward equal-status contact. I I That is, lawyers in fields 
that enjoy similar levels of prestige within the profession are more 
likely to associate with one another than are lawyers from fields with 
widely differing prestige. 
Obviously, these mechanisms reinforce one another. Practition-
ers in fields concerned with corporate clients' legal problems proba-
bly recruit at the same law schools, participate in the same client-
referral networks, and share similar prestige within the profession. 
The tendency of all these factors will be the same: to forge relation-
ships among the fields of corporate-law practice and to separate 
them from noncorporate fields. 
Characteristics more intrinsic to the practice of the various fields 
of law may also contribute to the degree of their social differen-
tiation. Similarities in the legal doctrines, statutes, or regulatory 
schemes dealt with by two fields might, thus, beget a kinship that 
would increase social proximity. So might their general modes of 
analysis or the strategic problems they characteristically address. 
Some fields of law, for example, involve "symbol manipulation," 
and others "people persuasion." The former category might include 
preparing securities-registration statements or similarly complex, 
technical documents; divorce, criminal, or personal injury work 
might fall into the latter category. 
This distinction relates, of course, to the more general differentia-
tion of the types of tasks performed. The practitioners in some fields 
are nearly always in court or preparing for it, while other fields con-
10. There are two kinds of "social distance." E. LAUMANN, PRESTIGE AND ASSOCIATION 
IN AN URBAN COMMUNITY (1966); McFarland & Brown, Social Distance as a Metric: A Sys-
tematic Introduction lo Smallest Space Analysis, in BONDS OF PLURALISM 213 (E. Laumann ed. 
1973). One is the extent to which two or more phenomena (in our case, the fields oflaw) differ 
on any number of social variables. Thus, this sense of the term simply describes the degree to 
which the phenomena are socially distinct. For an indication of social distance among the 
fields of Jaw, see Figure 1 in text following note 21 i'!fra. The other kind of social distance 
refers to the extent of social interaction among specified persons or groups. The first kind of 
social distance may, of course, influence the second. Thus, the differences or similarities in the 
fields' substantive law, in their characteristic tasks, in the settings of their practice, in their 
practitioners' social origins, or in their clients may increase or decrease the social interaction 
among the practitioners of those fields. 
l l. See E. LAUMANN, supra note IO, at 134-35. 
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sist almost exclusively of office practice. And, within both litigation 
and office practice, further fundamental distinctions may be drawn. 
Within litigation, important distinctions of status and task type exist 
between state court and federal court litigation and between trial and 
appellate work. Within office practice, lawyers in some fields prima-
rily advise clients ( on possible tax or antitrust consequences of alter-
native courses of action, for. example, or on techniques of real estate 
acquisition). Lawyers in other fields, such as matrimonial law, 
devote much time and energy to the emotional needs of clients, to 
personal counseling, or to smoothing ruffled feathers. Lawyers in 
still other fields characteristically spend considerable time drafting 
· legal documents such as wills, trust agreements, debentures, or con-
tracts. To the extent that these distinct tasks call for distinct skills, 
the mobility of lawyers among fields requiring dissimilar skills is in-
hibited. The likelihood that a lawyer will do a substantial amount of 
work in two fields of law is, of course, one measure of the social 
distance between the fields. Once that probability passes a certain 
point, we would say that no social or behavioral distinction exists 
between the two fields and that any distinction between them is 
purely conceptual or doctrinal. 
For similar reasons, the fields of law that deal with statutory or 
regulatory codes may be more insular than those that work primarily 
with older common law. Every lawyer learns the basic principles of 
the common law in law school and, thus, may accept a simple tort or 
contract case even though he principally attends to some other field. 
By contrast, lawyers may be less confident of their skills, or less will-
ing to invest the time necessary to acquire them, in fields such as 
broadcast regulation or labor law, and there may be less tendency to 
accept the occasional case in that kind of field. Much of the innova-
tion in regulatory law, with the consequent growth of multi-volume 
codes, has occurred at the federal level, spawning entirely new spe-
cialties in federal regulatory law. Becaus·e these new fields share 
some common elements or common skills (and also because of the 
types of clients, the networks among clients and lawyers, and the 
differences between federal and state procedural rules), the distinc-
tion between federal practice and state practice also tends to create 
social distance among the fields-federal law tends to involve larger, 
corporate clients and to enjoy higher prestige within the profession. 
Finally, fields of law that process large numbers of individual 
clients through the state courts are socially distant from the fields 
that often require several man-years of lawyers' time on each case 
(antitrust work, for example). But a fundamental socioeconomic dif-
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ference corresponds to this difference among the fields. High-vol-
ume cases and the lawyers who handle them are unlikely to resemble 
the processing or the processors of "unique" legal problems, but the 
discovery of a unique issue is likely to be a function of the amount of 
time that lawyers devote to a case, and thus of the amount of money 
that the client spends on lawyers. If the stakes are high, the 
problems can become very complex; if the client lacks money, his 
problems are likely to be routine. 
Service to the individual client is often repetitious and therefore 
dull. Although a divorce, a limb wasted by an automobile accident 
or by medical malpractice, a home-mortgage foreclosure, a sanity 
hearing, a criminal charge, a lost job, or an adoption or child-cus-
tody proceeding may all involve anxiety and suffering for the client, 
the specialized 13:wyer often finds them routine. The intellectual 
challenges they present will usually not be great. Since the law is a 
"learned profession," we may expect the profession to value and re-
spect intellectual acuity and effort and to assign prestige within the 
profession to the intellectually demanding fields. Because clients 
with deep pockets create the complex work, the value placed on in-
tellectual challenge will tend to lead lawyers into the service of a 
socioeconomic elite. In this respect, the legal profession differs from 
medicine. An exotic medical problem may afflict rich or poor 
(though such a problem is no doubt more likely to be detected in the 
well-to-do), and prestige within the medical profession may not, 
therefore, correspond so closely to the wealth of patients. Even poor 
people can have prestigious diseases. 
One could posit a great many legal pro_f essions, perhaps dozens, 
and to some degree real distinctions separate all these types of law-
yers. But one fundamental difference accounts for much of the vari-
ation within the legal profession: the difference between lawyers who 
represent large organizations ( corporations, labor unions, or govern-
ments) and those who represent individuals or individuals' small 
businesses. Let us proceed, then, to the data that lead us to that con-
clusion. 
II. MEASUREMENT OF THE CATEGORIES 
Differentiation within the legal profession has occurred despite 
official endorsement of a holistic conception of the profession. Un-
like the medical profession, which formally recognizes and certifies 
many specialities, the legal profession enshrines the myth of the 
omnicompetent practitioner. With only minor and recent excep-
tions, the profession's ethical rules forbid lawyers to represent them-
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selves as specialists except in three small, abstruse fields: patents, 
trademarks, and admiralty. 12 Nonetheless, many distinct fields ofle-
gal work clearly exist, and we began our research by categorizing 
those fields. 
In compiling the list of thirty fields of legal work that we 
presented to our lawyer-respondents, we consulted the literature and 
sought to employ categories that would be familiar to lawyers. The 
list, therefore, consisted of labels that practicing lawyers commonly 
use to describe recognized legal specialities or types of practice. We 
decided to use fairly fine-grained categories and to combine them 
later if our sample contained too few respondents in any specialty to 
permit separate analysis of it. 
We asked each respondent to indicate whether he devoted less 
than five percent, five to twenty-five percent, twenty-five to fifty per-
cent, or more than fifty percent of his professional time to each of the 
thirty types of work. The respondents who reported that they de-
voted twenty-five percent or more of their professional time to a field 
are the practitioners whose responses were used in computing the 
characteristics of the fields that are reported here. For example, we 
derived the attributes of "securities" law and of its practitioners from 
the responses of lawyers who estimated that they spend at least a 
quarter of their legal effort on securities law. 
Obviously, this criterion is largely arbitrary and, because our 
categories unavoidably overlap, our respondents' classifications of 
their work must be imprecise. 13 If we had set the inclusion level at 
fifty percent of legal effort, we would have had "purer" catego-
ries---categories less contaminated by the responses of practitioners 
not strongly committed to or involved with the field-but we would 
also have lost data and our findings would have been based on 
smaller numbers. Had we chosen the five-percent level, we would 
have been more inclusive, but we would also have had a weaker, 
more contaminated measure of the field's characteristics. At the 
12. See ABA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 2-105(A)(l) (1977); Zehnle, 
Specialization in the Legal Profession, in LEGAL SPECIALIZATION 20 (Specialization Mono-
graph No. 2, 1976). 
· 13. Since we also asked the respondents several other questions about their practices, we 
can distinguish somewhat more finely within certain fields of law. Within the tax field, for 
example, corporate tax attorneys differ considerably from personal tax attorneys. Similarly, 
we can distinguish between lawyers who handle corporate real estate transactions and those 
who primarily handle residential real estate matters, and between litigators who represent cor-
porations and those who represent individuals. Thus, we determined whether practitioners 
who reported doing tax, real estate, or litigation work received 80% or more of their profes-
sional income from business clients. If they did, we designated those lawyers as active in 
business tax, business real estate, or business litigation. We assigned all others to the personal 
tax, real estate, or litigation categories. 
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twenty-five-percent level, of course, the respondents we counted in a 
given field may be even more active or involved in one or two other 
fields of law, where they will also be counted in our data. 14 This 
measure, then, conservatively states the degree of differentiation 
among the fields of law. 
III. THE FINDINGS 
Notwithstanding our conservative measure of the differentiation 
among fields of law, we found that differentiation to be quite sub-
stantial. Rather than recite the scores for the full set of twenty-five 
fields on all forty variables analyzed-an even thousand observa-
tions-we present our data more parsimoniously. The nuance lost 
by reducing the data is compensated for by the increased compre-
hensibility of the overall structure. We summarize the data here, 
thus, in two simple tables and one rather more complex figure. The 
first table displays the differentiation among selected fields of law on 
a number of social variables; the second examines the hierarchical 
structure of that differentiation, on the same variables, across a set of 
categories that includes all of the fields; and the figure graphically 
represents the structure of the relationships among the twenty-five 
fields of law, simultaneously accounting for several sorts of social 
variation among them. 
Table 1 presents the findings for six selected fields of law on 
twenty variables. The variables, which were drawn from several 
types of data, include characteristics of the fields' clients and of the 
patterns of the practitioners' relationships with clients, the tasks per-
formed in the fields, the nature of the social organizations or institu-
tions in which the fields are practiced, the types of law schools 
attended by the fields' practitioners, and some information about the 
practitioners' social origins. 
Even a cursory inspection of Table I discloses large differences 
among the fields on many of the variables. Client volume, for exam-
ple, ranges from a median of 3 in public utilities to I 02 for divorce. 
(A field not presented here, personal injury plaintiffs' work, has an 
even higher client volume: a median of 151 clients represented in the 
past year.) The percentage of lawyers in each field who are solo 
14. The extent of this double-counting is discussed briefly in the text at note 19 i,!fra and 
detailed in E. Laumann & J. Heinz, supra note 8. 
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practitioners ranges from zero to sixty-one, and the percentage of 
those who practice in firms with more than thirty lawyers ranges 
from zero to seventy-five. (This range of variation occurs among 
only five fields, excluding criminal prosecution.) Similarly, the per-
centage of lawyers who attended "elite" law schools ranges from 
zero to fifty, that for "local" law schools ranges from fifteen to sixty-
seven, and each of the three religion categories has a range of at least 
forty percentage points. The percentage of practitioners reporting 
that their work involves "technical procedures" rather than "negoti-
ating and advising" ranges from ten to seventy-one across the six 
fields. Thus, the fields are highly differentiated on these important 
variables. Moreover, we will argue that this striking differentiation is 
highly ordered, that it is organized in a consistent hierarchy. 
The pattern of the differences among the fields on many of the 
variables seems clear and interpretable. The mean percentage of 
blue-collar clients served by these six fields ranges from zero to 
thirty-eight, while the mean percentage of income received from ma-
jor corporate clients-the other side of the socioeconomic 
scale-ranges from four to sixty-one ( columns 2 and 3). Disregard-
ing criminal prosecution, where by definition government is the only 
client, the rank orders of the fields on these two client-type variables 
are, without deviation, exactly reversed. Many of the other variables 
reproduce this same rank order to a greater or lesser degree. If we 
measure the adherence of the other variables to this order by the 
rather stringent criterion that no more than one field may depart 
from it and that that field may depart by no more than one position 
in the rank, we find that the following variables qualify: 
-the volume of clients served by the field (median number of clients 
represented during past year-column 5); 
-the frequency of state court appearances (median number per 
month-column 6); 
-the degree of specialization by practitioners in the field (percentage 
of respondents indicating high specialization-column 10); 
-the percentage oflawyers in the field who are solo practitioners (col-
umn II); 
-the percentage of practitioners who work in law firms of more than 
thirty lawyers ( column 12); 
-the percentage of practitioners who attended a "local" law school 
( one of four law schools located in Chicago and serving primarily a 
"local" market-column 15). 
Several more of the variables, while less strongly associated with this 
rank order, nonetheless share it to an obvious degree. 
If we inspect the intercorrelations among four of the variables 
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• The following notes explain the correspondingly numbered column headings in 
Tables I and 2: 
(I) "Number of Practitioners" refers to the number of persons who devoted at least 
25% of their time to the field of law or, in the case of Table 2, to the group of fields. All 
other entries in the row rest on this sample base but are reduced to exclude those few 
individuals who did not provide the information reported in a given column. 
We asked the following question to determine the lawyer's distribution of time 
across fields of law: 
While a lawyer's time is often spread over many different areas of the law, we wish, 
for comparative purposes, to characterize those areas in which you spent the major 
part of your time during the last twelve months. [The respondent received a card 
listing thirty fields of law.) In which of the listed areas have you spent more than 
fifty per cent of your time, between twenty-five and fifty per cent of your time, 
between five and twenty-five per cent? 
The 30 fields of law were reduced to 25 as follows: We excluded four fields of law from 
our analysis because of their insufficient size (Admiralty, Environmental Defense, Envi-
ronmental Plaintiff, and Condemnations). We redefined three areas of law to include 
fields that by themselves had insufficient cases. (Family Law was transformed to in-
clude General Family Practice-Paying clients, General Family Practice-Poverty level 
clients, and Consumer-Buyer Law. Commercial Law was transformed to include Con-
sumer-Seller Law. Personal Real Estate was transformed to include Landlord/Tenant.) 
Lawyers who spent time in Tax, Real Estate, and Civil Litigation were classified as 
follows: if they derived 80% or more of their income from business clients, they were 
classified as Business Real Estate, Business Tax, and Business Litigation; if they derived 
less than 80% of their income from business clients, or if this information was missing, 
they were classified in Personal Real Estate, Personal Tax, and General Litigation. 
(2) "Mean Percent Blue-Collar Clients" refers to the average percentages reported 
by the respondents in answer to the following question: 
Would you now think about the clients for whom you have handled personal mat-
ters in the last twelve months. [The respondent received a card listing five occupa-
tional categories.) What proportion of your clients fall into the occupational 
categories, Professional, Technical, Managerial, Sales and Clerical, Blue-Collar 
Workers, Unemployed, Retired, In-School, Keeping House? 
Column 2 is the average percentage of Blue-Collar Clients. We assigned a value of zero 
to house counsel, government lawyers, and lawyers who spent less than 10% of their 
work on "personal matters" (defined as legal work for persons rather than for busi-
nesses}, as they were not asked this question. 
(3) "Mean Percent Business Income from Major Corporate Clients" refers to the 
average percentage reported by those respondents who had indicated that they received 
10% or more of their income from work for businesses and who then answered the 
following question: 
What proportion of your "business income" would come from the following size 
business clients? 
The categories were major corporations (Standard Oil, American National Bank, Ab-
bott Laboratories, Playboy Enterprises, Pepper Construction-those with over $10 mil-
lion in sales per year}, medium-sized firms, or small businesses (neighborhood stores, 
local restaurants, local real estate brokers, etc.-those with less than $250,000 sales per ._ 
year). Practitioners who responded that they were employed as corporate house coun- § 
sel were recorded as deriving 100% of their income from major corporate clients. We <> 
re.corded government-employed lawyers as deriving no income from major corporate § 
clients. ~ 
(4) "Mean Percent Stable Clients" refers to the average of the estimates reported 
by the respondents in answering the following question: 
What proportion of all your clients have you represented for three years or more? 
We did not ask house counsel or government lawyers this question and assigned them a 
value of 100% on this variable. 
(5) "Median Number of Clients per Year" refers to the medians of the numbers 
reported in response to the following question: 
During the past twelve months, approximately how many clients have you done 
some work for-more than just going through a file, or turning over a file to an-
other lawyer? 
Again, house counsel and government lawyers were not asked this question and were 
assigned a value of one. 
(6) "Median Number of Stale Court Appearances per Montli'' refers to the median 
number of state trial and state appellate court appearances per month over the past 
year, as reported by the respondents. 
(7)-(10) refer to the following question: 
Different kinds of law require different kinds of professional activities. [The re-
spondent received a card listing seven pairs of statements.] Each pair represents 
polar opposites. If the situation in your practice is midway between poles, circle 
code 3; if your situation is at one or the other extreme, circle I or 5; if your position 
leans somewhat to either pole, circle 2 or 4. 
The percentages reported in columns 7 through IO of these Tables are based on the two 
values closest to the specified extreme (that is, either values of one or two, or values of 
four or five). 
(7) "Percent Higlr E11croac/1me111 011 Practice" refers to the proportion of respon-
dents who described their legal practice in the following way: "There are aspects of my 
professional work which are being encroached upon by other occupations." This con-
trasted with an alternative description: "No other occupation is engaging in the kinds of 













(8) "Percent Hig/1 011 Teclrnical Procedures" refers to the proportion of respondents w 
who described their practice in the following way: "My area demands skills in handling 
highly technical procedures rather than skills in negotiation and advising clients." This 
contrasted with an alternative description: "My specialty and type of practice requires 
skills in negotiating and advising clients, rather than detailed concern with technical 
rules." 
(9) "Percent Hig/1 Para-Professional Could Handle Practice" tefers to the propor-
tion of respondents who described their legal practice in the following way: "A para-
professional could be trained to handle many of the procedures and documents in my 
area of the law." This contrasted with an alternative description: "The type and content 
of my practice is such that even an educated layman couldn't really understand or 
prepare the documents." 
(10) "Percent Higlz Specialization of Work" refers to the proportion of respondents 
who described their legal practice in the following way: "The area of law in which I 
work is so highly specialized that it demands I concentrate in just this one area." This 
contrasted with an alternative description: "The nature of my legal practice is such that 
I can handle a range of problems covering quite a number of different areas of legal 
practice." 
(11)-(13) refer to the average percentages reported in response to the following ques-
tion: 
Which category [the respondent received a card with ten types of practice: solo; 
firm; federal, state, municipal/county or military government; corporate, insur-
ance, banking or railroad house counsel; or other] best describes your job? 
We combined the four house counsel subcategories into one category (column 13). We 
then asked the respondents "How many lawyers are in your firm/office now?" Column 
12 reports the percentages of respondents who are in firms with more than 30 lawyers. 
(14) "Percent Al/ended 'Elite' Law Sc/zools" refers to the proportion of resp .. ndents 
who received their law degrees from Chicago, Columbia, Harvard, Michigan, St,mford, 
and Yale. The 104 law school deans who responded to a survey by Blau and Margulies 
ranked these six schools among the "top five" law schools substantially more often than 
they did any other school. See Blau & Margulies, A Researc/1 Replication: T/ze Reputa-
tions of American Professional Sclzools, CHANGE. Winter 1974-1975. at 44. Though 
unsatisfactory in some respects, the survey seems adequate for our purposes. The low-
est ranked of these six schools, Stanford, was rated in the top five by 45 of the 104 
deans. The next closest school received only 19 such ratings. 
(15) "Percent Al/ended 'Local' Law Sc/10ols" refers to the proportion of respon-
dents who received their law degrees from De Paul, Kent, Loyola, and Marshall, all 
Jru:ated in the city of Chicago. The other two law schools located in Chicago, North-
western and The University of Chicago, are more commonly regarded as serving a 
national clientele. 
( 16)-( 18) refer to the following question in the interview: 
Do you have a religious preference? That is, are you either Protestant, Roman 
Catholic, Jewish or something else? 
We then asked Protestants to specify their denominations and Jews to specify whether 
they were Orthodox, Conservative, or Reform. 
(16) "Percent Type I Pro/es/ants" refers to the percentage of respondents who indi-
cated an affiliation with the following Protestant denominations: Congregational, Pres-
byterian, Episcopal, and the United Church of Christ. 
(17) "Percent Catlzolic" refers to the percentage of practitioners who said that their 
religious preference was Roman Catholic. 
(18) "Percent Jewislz" refers to the percentage of practitioners who either ex-
pressed a preference for Judaism in response to the above question or indicated that 
they were of Jewish origin in response to the question: "What nationality background 
do you think of yourself as having-that is, besides being American?" 
( 19) "Percent Metropolitan Origin" refers to the percentage of respondents report-
ing that they resided during their high school years in a metropolitan area with a popu-
lation in excess of 250,000. 
(20) "Mean Age" is the average age of the respondents in the field or group of 
fields. 
(21) "Prestige Score" refers to the standardized prestige scores of the fields previ-
ously reported in Laumann & Heinz, Speciali:alton and Prestige in tlze Legal Profession, 
1977 AM. B. FOUNDATION RESEARCH J. 155. A random subsample (N=224) of the 
total sample of Chicago lawyers was asked the following question: 
On the following specialty list would you please indicate the general prestige of 
each specialty within the legal profession at large. 
The respondents rated each of 30 "specialties" or fields of law on a five-point scale, 
from "outstanding" to "poor." We then computed the mean rating for each field. To 













by determining the grand mean of the 30 field means and its standard deviation and 
then subtracting the grand mean from each field mean and dividing by the standard 
deviation. To eliminate decimal points and negative numbers. we multiplied the stan- _ 
dard score by 100 and added 50 to the result. Thus, "fifty" represents the average mean ';f 
prestige rating. with ten points being the standard deviation. To illustrate: "Securities," :-
the most highly regarded field, is 1.8 standard deviations above the average mean pres- .... !=!' 
tige rating, while "General Family (Poverty)," with its score of 34, is 1.6 standard devi-
ations below the average mean. 
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included in Table 1-the percentage of blue-collar clients ( column 
2), client volume ( column 5), the percentage of solo practitioners 
( column 11 ), and the percentage of practitioners who attended local 
law schools (column 15~omputed across the full set of twenty-five 
fields, we find that all six of the correlation coefficients in the matrix 
range between .78 and .89. Since these are correlations of aggregated 
data (that is, they are performed on the averages or composite scores 
for whole fields rather than for individual respondents), we would 
expect relatively high coefficients, but these are high by almost any 
standard. In fact, one of the most vexing problems we confronted in 
analyzing these data is that the variables are so highly associated 
with one another, either positively or negatively; that is, the variables 
have the statistical property of multicollinearity. 15 This makes it 
difficult, at the least, to distinguish each variable's independent ef-
fects, but the thing to note at this point is that a strong, overarching 
structure appears to organize these variables when they are analyzed 
at the level of the fields of law. It is less important for our purposes 
to state precisely each variable's effect on tb,_e legal profession's over-
all social structure than it is to observe their coincidence. The vari-
ables appear to reflect interrelated social processes that reinforce one 
another to produce an impressively persistent and highly coherent 
structure; the legal profession, in our view, is what quantitatively ori-
ented sociologists call an "overdetermined" social system. We will 
argue that the types of clients served-the characteristics of the cli-
ents and of their use of lawyers-are the primary explanatory vari-
ables that organize and control the others, but such proofs as we will 
be able to off er are necessarily less statistical than sociological. 
To facilitate our observation of this structure of differentiation 
within the profession, we present a second table utilizing data on all 
twenty-five fields grouped into six hierarchical categories. Table 2 is 
similar in form to Table 1 and includes the same set of variables, but, 
rather than report values at the level of individual fields of law, it 
presents scores for larger groupings of the fields. As Table 1 indi-
cates, our sample includes relatively few practitioners in many of the 
fields, and the groupings of fields thus provide larger, more stable 
numbers for analysis. 16 
Because the groups contain fields that differ substantially, the ag-
15. See H. BLALOCK, SocIAL STATISTICS 454-64 (2d ed. 1972); Gordon, Issues in Multiple 
Regression, 13 AM. J. Soc. 592, 596 (1968). 
16. For an analysis of the number of lawyers practicing in the various fields of law, the 
extent of co-practice of the fields, and other patterns in the allocation of lawyers' time, see E. 
Laumann & J. Heinz, supra note 8. 
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gregation of the fields suppresses the degree of variance, as com-
pared with that at the level of the individual fields. Nonetheless, the 
differentiation among the groups that we observe in Table 2 remains 
quite substantial. Very large ranges still occur on the two variables 
relating to socioeconomic type of client ( columns 2 and 3), client vol-
ume ( column 5), frequency of state court appearances ( column 6), 
type of practice organization ( columns 11, 12, and 13), and percent-
age of high-status Protestants among the practitioners (column 16). 
Five more of the variables have a range of at least 100%; that is, the 
maximum value at least doubles the minimum. These are the "tech-
nical procedures," "paraprofessional," and "specialization" task 
variables (columns 8, 9, and 10), and the law school types (columns 
14 and 15). Thus, thirteen of the nineteen variables exhibit differ-
ences among the groups of at least this magnitude. 
Four of the groups of fields lie in the corporate sector or "hemi-
sphere" of the profession; the remaining two fall in the sector that 
primarily represents individuals or small businesses. We have dis-
tributed the fields among the groups as follows: 17 
CORPORATE SECTOR 
Large Corporate Group 
Antitrust (Defense) 
Business Litigation 


















Personal Business Group 
General Litigation 
Personal Real Estate 
Personal Tax 
Probate 




General Family Practice 
Personal Injury (Plaintiffs) 
17. Not entirely by accident, the six fields of law presented in Table I include one from 
each of the six groups listed, in the same order. 
June 1978) The Legal Profession 1127 
We intend the groups of fields to comprehend cognate areas of 
practice. As indicated above, we believe that the types of clients 
served primarily define these areas. We have refrained, however, 
from simply using statistically generated clusters of fields to maxi-
mize homogeneity in the client-type data; though those data in-
formed our categorization, we did not derive the groups solely by 
empirical methods. Instead, we also took into account conceptual 
notions about the nature of the fields, including subjective character-
istics of the clients and of the substance of the work. 18 
The tables also include a category of "generalists"-ninety re-
spondents who did not devote as much as twenty-five percent of their 
time to any one field and thus are included in none of the fields or 
groups of fields. Seventy-eight more respondents (ten percent of our 
random sample) were not then practicing law; the tables include only 
the responses of the 699 practicing lawyers. As noted above, we 
"double-counted" some of those respondents in ascertaining the 
characteristics of the individual fields. Many respondents qualify for 
inclusion in more than one field within the groups used in Table 2, 
but in computing group scores we counted each respondent within 
the group only once. A respondent who devoted at least twenty-five 
percent of his time to fields in two or more groups, however, was 
included in the analysis of each of those groups. With the twenty-
five-percent-time criterion, therefore, a respondent might theoreti-
cally be included in as many as four fields. We discuss overlap 
among the fields and groups in detail in our paper on the organiza-
18. Thus, the "regulatory" group is distinguished from the "general corporate" by a sub-
stantive concern with economic enterprises that are regulated by independent or quasi-in-
dependent governmental agencies, and the "political" group includes fields concerned with 
formal governmental functions, fields in which a successful practice or career reputedly de-
pends upon good political connections. (For our purposes, governments and labor unions are 
corporate bodies.) q: Coleman, Loss of Power, 38 AM. SocY. REV. I, I (1973) (corporate 
bodies are juristic persons capable of possessing resources and interests). The "large corpo-
rate" group includes those fields we thought most likely to serve the largest business corpora-
tions. In the mean percentage of practice income received from "major" corporate clients, 
however, personal injury defense work ranks higher than some of the fields that we included in 
the large corporate group. Nonetheless, our categorizations seem appropriate. Though the 
insurance companies represented by personal injury defense lawyers are certainly corporations 
with large assets and dollar volume, the law and the facts involved in personal injury cases 
distinguish their problems from the legal problems of large corporations per se. By contrast, 
securities and antitrust defense problems are the sorts oflegal matters that afflict large corpora-
tions almost exclusively. Though businesses of all sizes are concerned with taxes, both the 
complexity and the consequences of tax problems tend to be directly proportional to a corpora-
tion's size. A corporation is also likely to be sizeable ifit is concerned with the legal problems 
involved in real estate development, and only large corporations can afford to use litigation 
regularly as a corporate strategy. We might well have placed the practice of labor law for 
management clients in the "regulatory" group with the representation of unions, but we in-
cluded it in the large corporate group instead because the companies with union difficulties 
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tion of lawyers' work, 19 but we may note here that, of the 699 prac-
ticing lawyers, the 90 "generalists" are included in none of the 
groups, 380 respondents are counted in only one group, 209 in two 
groups, and the remaining 20 in three group·s. In general, this 
double counting has the conservative effect of understating differen-
tiation among the fields of law. 
IV. THE MULTIDIMENSIONAL SCALOGRAM ANALYSIS 
We have noted the magnitude of the differences among the fields 
oflaw on several variables and have observed the more obvious pat-
terns of those differences, but it is difficult to grasp the overall struc-
ture of the differentiation by pondering numbers in a table. If we 
consider simultaneously several kinds of similarities and differences 
in the fields and group the fields accordingly, what will be the result-
ing structure? In a graphic representation of that structure, will the 
fields be grouped by type of client or will some other dimension or 
dimensions appear to determine the structure? 
Multidimensional scalogram analysis is one approach to answer-
ing these questions.2° Figure 1 depicts the relationships among the 
fields of law, representing them as points in two-dimensional space 
and accounting for their positions on a number of variables. Fields 
with similar profiles lie in close proximity (that is, share a region of 
sufficiently serious to warrant hiring a labor lawyer are likely to be quite large employers. In 
their study of the Missouri Bar, Watson and Downing treated union representation as a dis-
tinct specialty but included management labor work in their general corporate law category. 
R. WATSON & R. DOWNING, THE POLITICS OF THE BENCH AND THE BAR 24-25 (1969). 
Our division of the personal client sector into two groups rests upon a similar distinction in 
the substance of the work. The "personal business" group includes fields concerned with the 
financial transactions of individuals (or of small businesses owned by individuals or families), 
while the "personal plight" group includes fields concerned with emotional issues, with per-
sonal freedom or liberty, or with personal anguish. We do not mean to suggest that the latter 
fields have no financial consequences for the clients. Significant financial burden may accom-
pany personal anguish-especially in personal injury work, general family practice, or di-
vorce-but the distinguishing characteristic of the "personal plight" fields is their emotive 
content. 
Several hierarchical cluster analyses (diameter method), see Johnson, Hierarchical Cluster-
ing Schemes, 32 PSYCHOMETRIKA 241 (1967), were performed using selected combinations of 
the client characteristic variables described in Table I. In each case, the first two principal 
components of a factor analysis of the relevant intercorrelation matrix were used as the prox-
imity estimators for the clustering routine. The cluster structure was quite consistent across the 
various solutions. In devising the clusters used in this paper, however, we decided for substan-
tive reasons to assign labor union law to the corporate client sector rather than leave it with the 
personal client fields with which it had clustered. Similarly, we moved civil rights from the 
corporate client sector to the personal plight cluster for definitional reasons. 
19. E. Laumann & J. Heinz, supra note 8. 
20. Specifically, we have used MSA-1. See GEOMETRIC REPRESENTATIONS OF RELA· 
TIONAL DATA (J. Lingoes ed. 1977) [hereinafter cited as GEOMETRIC REPRESENTATIONS]; 
Laumann & House, Living Room Styles and Social Attributes: The Patterning of Material Arti• 
facts in a Modern Urban Community, in THE LOGIC OF SOCIAL HIERARCHIES 195 (1970). 
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Euclidean space); those with greater differences on the variables lie 
at greater distances from one another.21 
The twelve variables used in this analysis are: 
I. Business clients (mean percentage of income received from clients 
who are businesses rather than persons). 
2. Client volume (median number of clients in the past year). 
3. Client stability (mean percentage of clients represented for three 
years or more). 
4. Lawyer referrals of clients (mean percentage of clients obtained 
through referrals from other lawyers). 
5. Choice of clients (percentage of practitioners indicating "wide lat-
itude in selecting" clients). 
6. Technical procedures versus negotiating and advising (percentage 
of practitioners indicating their work involves "highly technical 
procedures rather than skills in negotiation and advising clients"). 
7. Litigation in state courts (median number of state court appear-
ances per month). 
8. Size of practice organizations (median number of lawyers in the 
firm or other organization in which practitioners work). 
9. Government employment (percentage of practitioners employed 
by federal, state, or local government). 
IO. "Local" law school (percentage of practitioners who attended any 
of four "local" law schools in Chicago). 
21. The Euclidean distances are assumed to be a monotonic function of an underlying, 
multidimensional construct, "legal role,'' that creates social distance among the fields of law 
because of dissimilarities in some specified set of their characteristics. We have previously 
argued that we can conceptualize the fields of law as a set of differentiated social roles and that 
an individual lawyer may occupy a number of these roles simultaneously. E. Laumann & J. 
Heinz, supra note 8. 
In the multidimensipnal scalogram analysis, our interval level data were transformed into 
ordinal data. (MSA-1 requires, in fact, only nominal level data. See GEOMETRIC REPRESEN-
TATIONS, supra note 20). The derived Euclidean distances represented in the figure are, of 
course, metric and fully at the interval level of measurement, but the data used to derive these 
distances were at the ordinal level. That is, we specified the rank order of the fields on each 
variable, but not the distances between fields. 
The algorithm required a reduction in the number of values used on each of the variables. 
Therefore, we collapsed the range on each variable into two to four categories of fields. For 
example, we converted the percentages of Jewish practitioners in the fields into a four-point 
scale. We gave six fields with percentages of 10 to 15 a value of one, or "low"; five fields with 
percentages from 21 to 25 a value of two, or "medium low"; sc;ven fields with percentages 
ranging from 30 to 40 a value of three, or "medium high"; and seven fields with percentages 
from 42 to 57 a value of four, or "high." Except where extreme outlying cases occurred, we 
preserved natural breaks in the distributions. We simply dichotomized the percentages of gov-
ernment employees in the various fields: we gave the twelve fields with zero to five percent 
government employees the value one, and the remaining 13 fields, all having 15% or more, the , 
value two. Five of the variables were trichotomized. For example, in the percentage of in-
come received from business clients, we classed as "low" the ten fields with scores of less than 
50%; as "medium" the eight fields with 50 to 80%; and as "high" the remaining seven fields 
with over 80%. The input matrix thus consisted of the 25 fields in the rows and 12 columns of 
variables having entries of"l,'' "2,'' "3," or "4" corresponding to the respective field's position 
on each scale. 
Figure 1 portrays the two-dimensional solution, which had a very satisfactory coefficient of 
contiguity of .959 (a perfect fit would be 1.00) for only 50 iterations. 
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11. High-status Protestants (percentage of practitioners who state a 
preference for one of the "Type-I" Protestant denominations). 
12. Jewish origin (percentage of practitioners who report either Jew-
ish religion or ethnicity). 
Three criteria determined the choice of these 12 variables. First, to 
minimize the redundancy built into the model, we sought to avoid 
choosing highly intercorrelated variables. _Because of the multicol-
linearity in the data set, this was particularly important and difficult. 
Given the structured nature of the data-and, presumably, of the 
social system under study-we could have avoided substantial in-
tercorrelations completely only by choosing variables of tangential 
relevance or doubtful substantive significance. Second, we sought to 
represent the full range of types of data in the variables chosen and 
to avoid over-representing any one type. Thus, the twelve variables 
include one client-type variable, two concerning the nature of the 
Divorce . 
FIGURE 1 
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lawyer-client relationship, two on sources of clients, two task types, 
two types of practice organizations, one law school type, and two 
ethnicity variables. Finally, and perhaps most importantly, we re-
quired that the variables chosen have substantive significance. 
There is a persuasive case that each of the variables used might have 
important influence on the social distances among the fields. Those 
arguments have, in fact, already been summarized in Part I. 
As we see from the figure, the relationships among the fields form 
a U-shaped structure. The fields that serve corporate clients lie to 
the right; fields that serve persons rather than corporations lie to the 
left. Fields that serve either a mixture of the two or special sorts of 
corporations such as governments or labor unions fall toward the 
middle. If one draws a vertical line just to the left of the point repre-
senting criminal prosecution, we find that, with the sole exception of 
civil rights, all of the fields to the right of that line belong to our 
corporate sector and all of the fields to the left to the personal sector. 
The reader will recall that only one of the twelve variables used in 
the multidimensional scalogram analysis explicitly measures type of 
client-though, as we have already noted and argued, client volume 
and stability relate to these distinctions, and some of the other vari-
ables correlate with client type. 
The vertical dimension of the structure reflects the differences be-
tween litigation and office practice. The fields with higher rates of 
court appearances tend to be higher in the space; those that litigate 
less tend to be located lower. Other general patterns in the structure 
are perhaps less striking, but they are surely discernible. The fields 
with higher percentages of practitioners reporting a free choice of 
clients lie outside the U, while those with less client choice are found 
in the inner rim of the U-structure. The median size of the law firm 
or other practice organization increases as one moves from the upper 
left counterclockwise around the U. Client volume and the percent-
age of practitioners who attended a "local" law school both move in 
the opposite direction, increasing as one proceeds clockwise around 
the U. The percentage of stable clients generally increases as one 
moves toward the bottom of the figure. From previously reported 
research, we know that the most prestigious fields of law are at the 
upper right of the U and the lowest are at the upper left;22 prestige 
22. One might wonder why litigation fields should be high on both ends of the 
U-meaning that corporate litigators have higher prestige than many of the other corporate 
fields, while litigators in the personal sector have lower prestige than other personal-client 
fields. It may be that the greater visibility of litigators enhances their prestige if the substance 
of their cases is regarded as prestigious and enhances their derogation if the kinds of cases and 
clients with which they deal are derogated. 
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decreases in a generally orderly clockwise fashion. The correlation 
between the prestige order of the fields and their order on the U is 
.9.23 
The groupings of fields used in Table 2 also emerge rather clearly 
in the figure. A small cluster of high status fields representing the 
largest corporations lies at the upper right of the U. Moving clock-
wise, we then encounter a group of fields dealing with administrative 
law, particularly with federal regulatory agencies. These include 
patents and public utilities from our "regulatory" group and bank-
ing, business tax, and antitrust plaintiffs' work from our "general 
corporate" group. Further clockwise, another cluster, with more of a 
vertical dimension, contains the remainder of both of those groups. 
The work for larger business corporations appears to be concen-
trated higher on the right side of the U, and the size of the businesses 
represented decreases as one moves down. Our "political" group, 
which consists only of municipal work and criminal prosecution, lies 
just to the left.24 Criminal prosecution, obviously sui generis, is off 
by itself. Though criminal prosecutors represent a corporate client, 
the substance of their work and perhaps the networks of relation-
ships among practitioners move criminal prosecution away from the 
corporate fields and toward the "personal plight" group. Returning 
to the rim of the U, and still proceeding clockwise, we next find the 
four fields of the "personal business" group. Of these, the two that 
deal most with the transmission of wealth and thus with wealthier 
personal clients-probate and personal tax-lie nearest the 
corporate fields. Finally, at the upper left of the U, we find four of 
the five fields of the "personal plight" group. The fifth, civil rights, is 
a special case. Because half of its practitioners are full-time govern-
23. Laumann & Heinz, Specialization and Prestige in the Legal Profession, 1911 AM. B. 
FOUNDATION RESEARCH J. 155. The prestige rankings in that study used a somewhat different 
list of fields than that employed in this Article. Specifically, the prestige rankings did not 
differentiate between the "personal" and "business or corporate" sides of the tax, civil litiga-
tion, and real estate fields. 
To compare the prestige rankings with the order of the fields on the U-shaped multidimen-
sional scalogram analysis, therefore, we had to generate prestige scores for both sides of each 
of these three fields. We did so by computing a regression model, utilizing characteristics of 
the fields as the variables, that explained 80% of the variance of the prestige scores in the 
original list of fields. We then used that model to create prestige scores for the new fields 
according to their observed values for the same set of characteristics, as weighted by the regres-
sion equation. 
Finally, we calculated a rank-order correlation on the fields' prestige ranks, including the 
newly created prestige scores, and their ranks along the U-structure. This correlation is .90, 
and it is significant at and beyond the .01 level. 
We determined the ranks on the U by placing the fields on the smooth U-curve depicted in 
the Figure at the intersections with the curve of the shortest lines that could be drawn from the 
fields' points to the curve. 
We are indebted to Scott Marden for his assistance in this analysis. 
24. Note the proximity to these fields of labor union work. 
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ment employees, we could in fact define civil rights work as a gov-
ernmental function and place the field in the "political" group of the 
corporate sector, which is about where it appears in the figure.25 
These findings suggest that even though the measures used to de-
termine the characteristics of the fields of law (principally, the 
twenty-five percent time criterion) generate rather weak or contami-
25. Including civil rights work among the "personal plight" fields greatly increases the 
heterogeneity of that group on most of the variables. The civil rights field is atypical in that a 
substantial portion of the cases are handled as a public service without fee ("pro bono pub-
lico"). Ideological motivations may thus attract to this work lawyers who are unlikely to be 
found in the other personal-plight fields. For example, the distribution of civil rights lawyers 
amo'ng law school types looks much more like that of a field from the "large corporate" group 
than like any of the other fields in the personal-plight group-the percentage of civil rights 
lawyers who attended elite schools is more than twice that of the next highest personal-plight 
field. 
Still, the substance of its work seems to dictate the placement of civil rights. The civil 
rights field probably exemplifies par excellence the sort of legal work that deals with personal 
liberty and freedom. A plausible argument can be made, however, for placing civil rights 
work in the corporate sector. Outlining that argument illustrates how the variables interrelate 
and shed light upon the interpretation of one another. 
It is commonly believed that most of the practitioners doing civil rights work are corporate 
lawyers from large firms who handle a few such cases on a pro bono basis. As an elite of the 
bar committed to the protection of civil liberties, these lawyers are thought to include dispro-
portionate numbers of Jews and higher status Protestants. Arthur Corbin asserted as early as 
1922 that the profession's elite were more likely to serve "the poor and the friendless" than 
were lower status lawyers. Corbin, .Democracy and Education for the Bar, 4 AM. L. ScH. REV. 
725, 731 (1922). While some elite lawyers may devote small amounts of their time to civil 
rights law, however, the data on the 15 lawyers in our sample who devote 25% or more of their 
time to work that they label "civil rights" shows that both Jews and high-status Protestants 
(Type I) are underrepresented, that Catholics are represented in about the same percentage as 
in the total sample, and that both lower status Protestants (Type II) and the nonreligious are 
substantially over-represented. Some of the lower status Protestants are probably blacks, who 
are overrepresented in the civil rights practice by a factor of about six times their percentage in 
the bar (15.4% versus 2.5%). About twice the normal percentage of Southern and Eastern 
Europeans are found in civil rights work. The distribution of civil rights work by practice 
setting probably explains these results. Almost half of the lawyers who report devoting 25% or 
more of their time to civil rights work are government employees (47%), and another third 
practice in firms ofless than 10 lawyers. Only 13% of these civil rights lawyers are from large 
firms with more than 30 lawyers, and only 7% are from corporate law departments. Solo 
practitioners apparently cannot afford to do civil rights work; they are not represented at all. 
Nor, indeed, are lawyers from medium-sized firms. Thus, Catholics and Southern and Eastern 
Europeans may have disproportionate shares of civil rights work because they are over-
represented among government lawyers. See First Report, supra note 6, at 779-80 app. We do 
not wish to make much of all this, especially since· our sample includes only 15 civil rights 
lawyers at the 25% level of activity, but the genera! pattern seems clear. 
Perhaps the most interesting point to be noted here is that civil rights work, rather than 
being motivated by noblesse oblige, appears to be in large part a public function, performed by 
government employees who are compensated by tax funds. Accordingly, we could with almost 
equal justification place the civil rights field in the corporate client sector with other govern-
ment work. Though this reclassification would increase the sectors' homogeneity on several 
variables, the conceptual reasons already advanced have induced us to sacrifice this "tidiness." 
The work of the -profession is, in fact, a bit untidy in places, and it is important to note where 
points of ambiguity or overlap occur. The civil rights field presents one of the relatively rare 
opportunities for full-fledged corporate lawyers to practice law that deals with personal plight, 
with human suffering. Thus, the civil rights field, with a few others, is a point of intersection in 
the profession. Though quite a small field, it is one of those special places where residents of 
the profession's two hemispheres may meet one another. 
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nated categories, the variables display a consistent structure based 
primarily on the nature of the clients served by the fields. Because 
particular types of clients are frequently associated with correspond-
ing types of legal issues, however, it is often difficult to determine 
whether some aspect of the structure of the fields of law is more 
plausibly attributed to the nature of the clients served or to the 
knowledge or skills used in the fields. For example, in analyzing the 
overlap among the fields of law in the allocation of lawyers' time,26 
we found a small, tight cluster consisting of patent law and the two 
sides of antitrust law. What common attributes of patents and anti-
trust enhance the likelihood that a lawyer who practices one will also 
practice the other? Broadly, both fields involve legal doctrines that 
in some way regulate competition, and they share common origins in 
English legal history.21 
But this overlap in the doctrines of the fields is confounded by a 
corresponding overlap in the types of clients served. We may often 
think of patent lawyers as dealing with "inventors," and we may also 
think of inventors as individual entrepreneurs, independent, idiosyn-
cratic, obsessive, and quirky. This is, of course, a romantic, nine-
teenth-century view of the inventor, fostered by juvenile fiction of 
the Tom Swift genre. However quirky they may be, most commer-
cially significant inventors are now surely organization men in the 
research and development departments of major corporations, and 
most valuable patents are now owned by large corporations or ex-
ploited by them under license. As with antitrust specialists, there-
fore, patent lawyers' principal clients are corporations. The patent 
lawyers in our sample estimated that they derived an average of 
ninety percent of their practice income from businesses rather than 
persons. 
Moreover, the historical importance of using patents as a means 
of monopolizing further exacerbates this confounding of knowledge 
base and client type. One of the methods used by the classic trusts to 
monopolize an industry was acquisition of the patents for the key 
26. E. Laumann & J. Heinz, supra note 8. 
27. During the sixteenth century, the Crown increasingly granted favored individuals mo-
nopoly privileges or exclusive licenses through proclamations known as "letters patent" (that 
is, open or public letters). The Statute of Monopolies, 1623, 21 Jae. I, c. 3, curbed this practice. 
It voided the licenses or "patents" previously granted and provided that persons injured by a 
monopoly in the future could sue for treble damages, but it excepted patents granted to "the 
first and true inventor or inventors of ... manufactures." Thus, Holdsworth observes that the 
Statute of Monopolies was "the foundation of the patent law of the present day." 4 HOLDS· 
WORTH, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 353 (1924). See also J. RAHL & R. KENNEDY, CASES 
AND MATERIALS ON ANTITRUST LAW (1978). 
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manufacturing processes. 28 The clients who owned the patents be-
came, then, the clients charged with restraint of trade, and the legal 
issue became whether the scope of the patent-granted monopoly 
privilege conflicted with the scope of the antitrust laws.29 Today, 
litigation brought by the Justice Department, the Federal Trade 
Commission, and private plaintiffs frequently charges illegal restric-
tive practices in the licensing or use of patents. Patent-infringement 
claims are also met with antitrust counterclaims or a defense of mis-
use of the patent; that is, the defendant in the infringement action 
charges that the plaintiff used the patent to restrict competition in 
violation of the antitrust laws or of the policy favoring competition. 
Thus, both the doctrines and the types of clients served by the two 
fields at some points merge. 
To attempt to distinguish the independent effects of client type 
and of knowledge base on the structure of the fields would, in such 
circumstances, be not only difficult but artificial and misleading. We 
should, instead, appreciate that the two are inextricably entwined 
and then seek to understand their relationship and how the legal and 
social systems produced it. 
In some areas of the law, however, the adversary system provides 
a natural control of the two variables. In criminal law, labor law, or 
personal injury work, a rather rigid division separates practitioners 
serving opposing sides of the cases-with their corresponding, dis-
tinct types of clients-while the substance of the law is constant 
within each area. Therefore, where one doctrinal area of the law 
contains specialized fields of practice that are dictated by the type of 
client, we may want to examine the extent to which those fields are 
socially differentiated. How socially distant is labor law work for 
unions from the representation of management, criminal prosecution 
from criminal defense, or plaintiffs' antitrust or personal injury work 
from defendants'? We may, of course, look at the differences be-
tween those pairs of fields on any variables that particularly concern 
us, but the multidimensional scalogram analysis summarily meas-
ures the extent of their social distance. Inspecting Figure I, we find 
the two sides of labor law located relatively close together near the 
lower middle of the U. The other pairs, however, lie quite a bit fur-
ther apart: criminal prosecution and defense are both in the figure's 
28. See, e.g., United States v. United Shoe Mach. Co., 247 U.S. 32, 52-55 (1918) (United 
Shoe's acquisition of key patents by merger with and acquisition of companies holding those 
patents did not violate the antitrust law). In addition, see Justice Clarke's dissenting opinion, 
247 U.S. at 77-78. 
29. See, e.g., United Shoe Mach. Co. v. United States, 258 U.S. 451, 460-64 (1922). 
.. 
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mid-left region, but they are sufficiently separated to be clearly dis-
tinct; antitrust defense is considerably higher on the U's right side 
than is antitrust plaintiffs' work; and personal injury plaintiffs' work 
reaches the far upper left corner, while personal injury defense falls 
into the "general corporate" cluster located at the lower right.30 In 
some cases, therefore, differences in the clients served apparently 
produce clear social distinctions between the fields even though the 
fields' knowledge bases are substantially identical. 
We would argue, in fact, that the more the clients of two fields 
differ, the more socially distant the fields will tend to be. Consider, 
for example, the comparisons just made between these pairs of fields. 
Though labor unions and the corporations that battle them doubtless 
differ in many significant ways, both are usually large organizations 
with substantial assets. The differences between criminal defendants 
and the government officials whom prosecutors consider their clients 
are probably greater (though the two kinds of clients do on occasion 
coincide), and greater yet are the differences between clients of the 
pairs more widely separated in Figure I. The two sides of antitrust 
work appear to serve distinct sorts of businesses. Antitrust defense 
lawyers report that they derive seventy-seven percent of their prac-
tice income, on the average, from major corporations, while an aver-
age of only twenty-two percent of the income of antitrust plaintiffs' 
lawyers comes from major corporations. The plaintiffs' lawyers 
serve a much higher proportion of individual clients-they receive 
an average of forty percent of their practice income from individuals 
while only six percent, on the average, of defense lawyers' income 
comes from individuals. Of these four pairs, however, the distance is 
greatest between the two sides of personal injury work, and the dif-
ference in the clients is probably greatest there also. The clients of 
the personal injury defense lawyers are almost exclusively insurance 
companies-major corporations with very substantial assets.31 By 
contrast, the clients of the plaintiffs' lawyers are usually individuals, 
and, although doubtless drawn from a range of social classes, they 
30. Similarly, if we compare "general litigation" with litigation for business clients, thus 
holding the task type constant, we find business litigation at the far upper right but general 
litigation diagonally across the entire space at the lower left. In this case, however, the sub-
stantive law no doubt differs systematically with the kind of client. 
31. Our sampled personal injury defense lawyers reported that, on the average, 57% of 
their income from business clients came from "major'' corporations (which we had defined in 
the survey as corporations with sales in excess of ten million dollars annually). This percent-
age may sound modest, but it is quite large when compared with most fields-"general corpo-
rate" lawyers, for example, reported an average of only 38% of their income from major 
corporations-and is roughly equal to the average percentage of the corporate litigators, who 
reported 55% from major corporations. 
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are from the lower classes far more often than are the clients of most 
lawyers. 
Again, therefore, we conclude that the most plausible interpreta-
tion of the findings is that the nature of the clients served by the 
fields primarily determines the fields' social structure. If correct, this 
reading of the data raises an important question: given the tendency 
of the profession's structure to respond to interests and demands of 
clients-that is, of parties external to the profession-how much au-
tonomy does the legal profession enjoy in defining professional roles, 
in determining which lawyers will perform which services for which 
clients, and in organizing the delivery of those services? 
V. THE LEGAL AND MEDICAL PROFESSIONS COMPARED 
Sociological literature discussing the professions posits freedom 
of occupational activity as one of the principal identifying character-
istics of a profession. 32 This autonomy is said to result, at least in 
part, from the professionals' possession of arcane knowledge that 
their clients lack. 33 Since, by hypothesis, the client does not know 
the essentials of the professional's work and cannot evaluate it, the 
professional acts with a freer hand than do members of occupations 
whose consumers have a broad understanding of the occupation's 
work. A professional's client will, of course, usually know whether 
his lawsuit has been won or lost, or whether his illness has been 
cured, but he may not know whether another result should have 
been expected. 
Sociological thought concerning the professions has largely been 
shaped by the model of the medical profession, about which the 
literature is richest.34 The law may differ from medicine, however, 
in the extent to which the problems it addresses are defined by cli-
ents rather than by the professionals. Physicians use professionally 
defined standards to discriminate between cases that need attention 
and those that do not. The lawyer's client, by contrast, plays a large 
32. See, e.g., Greenwood, Attributes ef a Prefession, SOCIAL WORK, July 1957, at 45. See 
generally D. ROSENTHAL, supra note l. 
33. Other factors possibly contributing to this autonomy are, for example, social class dif-
ferences between professional and client, or mystification that sets apart the role of the profes-
sional regardless of any real difference in knowledge. 
34. See, e.g., J. BERLANT, PROFESSION AND MONOPOLY (1975); M. LARSON, THE RISE OF 
PROFESSIONALISM (1977); ROBERT STEVENS & ROSEMARY STEVENS, WELFARE MEDICINE IN 
AMERICA (1974); ROSEMARY STEVENS, AMERICAN MEDICINE AND THE PUBLIC INTEREST 
(1971). Dietrich Rueschemeyer has explicitly compared the legal and medical professions. 
Rueschemeyer, J)octors and Lawyers: A Comment on the Theory ef the Professions, l CANA-
DIAN REV. Soc. & ANTHROPOLOGY 17 (1964). His perspective differs from ours, but he covers 
some of the same points and we have benefitted from his analysis. 
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role in defining legal problems, in deciding whether and when he 
needs help. Indeed, there may be a distinction between the role of 
"client," a person who employs an expert to perform more or less 
well-defined services, and the role of "patient," a person whom the 
physician treats. It is only a bit too glib to put the point this way: 
The doctor decides when the patient needs an appendectomy, but 
the client decides when the client needs a divorce. 
Within the legal profession, however, the extent to which the cli-
ent defines the problem may well vary with the type of law and the 
nature of the client. Securities lawyers or corporate tax experts serve 
sophisticated business enterprises that can recognize and define their 
legal problems in considerable degree, while the generally less so-
phisticated clients of family lawyers are much less aware of their le-
gal needs. Thus, the corporation planning a securities issue, an 
acquisition, or a merger will present a relatively specific set of issues 
to the lawyer, while the blue-collar worker may not recognize that he 
has entered into a contract or may not see the need for a formal 
divorce. This suggests somewhat ironically that lawyers doing high-
prestige work are less likely to define their clients' problems than are 
lawyers doing lower-status work.35 On the other hand, in the legal 
work that enjoys high professional prestige, those who bring cases to 
lawyers will often be other lawyers. Large corporations that have 
significant securities and antitrust problems will also have corporate 
"house counsel" who will identify and analyze the businesses' legal 
problems and select specialized outside counsel to whom the work 
may be referred. Thus, though the client identifies the problem in 
such high-status work, a professional is still in control-it is a law-
yer, not someone outside the profession, who defines the need for 
legal work. But these lawyers are, after all, full-time employees of 
the client-corporations, answerable and, no doubt, responsive to the 
wishes of corporate management. 
Like the medical specialties, most of the fields of law are charac-
terized either by a substantive concentration (nephrology or cardiol-
ogy, antitrust or tax) or a common technology or skill (radiology or 
surgery, drafting or litigation). The legal system's adversary mode, 
however, frequently bifurcates some of the legal fields, causing law-
yers to specialize according to the type of client or side of the case. 
This phenomenon reflects a more general tendency of legal special-
ties to be organized around the needs of clients who are distinguisha-
ble by social type. Law differs from medicine in this respect. While 
35. Laumann & Heinz, supra note 23. 
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a "general family practice" exists to some extent in both law and 
medicine, and while a few members of both professions specialize in 
work with the poor, a patient may be classified as a "kidney prob-
lem" without any reference to his wealth or social position, but a 
client is unlikely to have antitrust or securities law problems unless it 
is wealthy. In fact, such a client will probably be a corporation with 
substantial economic and, perhaps, social and political power. Cer-
tain diseases disproportionately afflict the rich, and many others are 
more likely to be diagnosed in rich than in poor patients; indeed, 
some doctors specialize in treating the rich. But social implications 
seem likely to flow from the organization of legal specialties much 
more ineluctably than they do from medical specialization. 
The identification of lawyer with client may reflect the process 
and criteria by which clients select lawyers. The intimate nature of 
many medical problems notwithstanding, personal intimacy perhaps 
more often characterizes the relationship between lawyer and client 
than that between doctor and patient. Our relations with doctors 
tend to become routinized. In our early years, we submit to pre-
school physical exams; later, as the indignities of age afflict us, we 
are told to have routine annual physicals. Though these occasions 
involve some procedures that are, in a sense, intimate, the proce-
dures tend to follow a standard format and to become familiar. 
Even when we are ill, the doctor's questions are often standard: 
"Any nausea?" "Any abdominal cramps or pains?" Most of us see 
our lawyers, however, only when "ill"; we do not get routine annual 
legal examinations. When lawyers perform strictly legal functions, 
as opposed to general business or tax planning, the client has usually 
determined in advance that he has a problem and often that he faces 
some particular sort of "trouble." 
It is important that the lawyer, in discussing a client's problems, 
speak the client's language, both literally and symbolically. The le.: 
gal profession's greater reliance on extensive conversation between 
lawyer and client, rather than on a checklist of symptoms, may re-
quire that the lawyer and client share a range of discourse. But be-
yond this, the patient with nephritis probably cares less that his 
doctor share an outlook on life than that he be a good kidney man. 
The client, of course, also wants his lawyer to be technically compe-
tent, but the matters that law addresses frequently require a trust 
that goes beyond confidence in professional skill. The client must 
trust the lawyer's discretion and may even feel a need to have the 
lawyer sympathize with his position. Therefore, a client may often 
prefer a lawyer who shares his social characteristics. It is probably 
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more often important to clients than to patients that their profession-
als are of their own ethnic group, went to the same sort of school, or 
belong to the same clubs. This, then, is another reason why social 
types of clients tend to produce corresponding groupings of lawyers. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
A crucial issue in the study of any profession is this: To what 
extent does the profession manifest client interests ( or, perhaps, the 
interests of others outside the profession) and to what extent does it 
reflect its own concerns, interests, or values? Common lore says that 
lawyers are "hired guns," that within the vague limits of "profes-
sional responsibility" they do their clients' bidding. But the lore also 
holds that some forces or agencies within the legal profession serve 
to unify it, to give it a sense of identity or coherence. Thus, the bar 
associations, the law schools, or the court-appointed boards that con-
trol lawyer discipline and admission to the bar may be thought to 
create or enforce norms and values that originate within the profes-
sion. How accurate is the lore? Or, to put the same question in a 
manner that more clearly restates the research issue posed at the be-
ginning of this paragraph, what balance does the legal profession 
strike between competing intra-professional and extra-professional 
interests? 
As our statement of the question implies, the issue is one of de-
gree. Every profession reflects to some extent the economic, social, 
and ideological interests of its clients. All the professions also reflect 
norms and values of the professionals qua professionals-tenets that 
spring from the profession's own interests, ideology, and socializa-
tion process. To varying degrees and in varying ways in the different 
professions, the professionals sometimes speak for themselves and at 
other times advocate the interests of persons or groups outside the 
profession. Beyond their "hired gun" role (but by no means unre-
lated to it), lawyers and other professionals may adopt their clients' 
views and, thus advocate client interests because they have accepted 
them as their own. A cancer specialist may campaign for the control 
of environmental carcinogens even though a successful campaign 
might reduce the number of his patients. A tax lawyer may seek to 
simplify the tax code even though simplicity would reduce the de-
mand for his professional advice. (If our study is correct, however, a 
lawyer is not likely to advocate the abolition of a tax shelter if that 
would conflict with his client's interests.) Though we did not attempt 
it, one way to assess the relative importance to a profession of inter-
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nal and external interests might be to examine the frequency with 
which the professionals advocate each sort of interest. 
Professions may reflect this co-existence of interests, however, in 
a more subtle, but perhaps more fundamental manner. The interests 
may affect the social structure of the profession itself-they will in-
fluence the organization of the bar into groups or fields, the distribu-
tion of lawyers from different social origins among those groups, and 
the patterns of relationships among the lawyers. External influences 
that may shape the legal profession's social structure include the in-
terests of clients and the baggage that the professionals bring with 
them into the profession. The attitudes and behavior of profession-
als as professionals are, no doubt, affected by their other roles-as 
spouses, parents, churchmen, Daughters of the American Revolu-
tion, or Sons of Italy (ie., as clansmen or Klansmen). The early so-
cialization of professionals may also be relevant to their professions, 
as may their commitments to religious, political, or social values. 
But what is the relevance of our findings to these issues, and what 
are their implications for the profession? Our findings suggest that 
the second piece of lore is wrong. Bar associations, law schools, and 
court agencies appear to accomplish little social integration of the 
profession. Even the organized bar functions less as an interest 
group than as a forum within which interest groups compete for 
power. Unless some.coalition within the bar can mobilize powerful 
constituencies, often from outside the bar, and can thus impose its 
will on the profession as a whole, the profession is unlikely to take a · 
definite stand on a consequential issue. The legal profession can and 
does take definite stands, however, on issues that lack moment for 
most of the profession and most of its clients, and the organized bar 
often delegates such decisions to the concerned subgroup within the 
profession.36 In sum, the profession is so riven by conflict-reflect-
ing the conflicting interests of its clients-that the bar can reach a 
consensus only on inconsequential issues or on symbolic issues that 
permit the profession's differences to be "papered-over."37 
The data that we have collected and analyzed suggest that the 
legal profession is highly differentiated, that that differentiation is 
systematically structured, and that that structure is determined 
largely by the impact of client interests. As we noted above, auton-
36. That occurred in the Chicago Bar Association, for example, when it delegated the 
drafting of a new criminal code to a committee composed almost exclusively of criminal law-
yers. See Heinz, Gettleman, & Seeskin, Legislative Politics and the Criminal Law, 64 Nw. U.L. 
REV. 277, 317-25 (1969). 
37. See generally First Report, supra note 6,' at 771-75. 
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omy is said to be one of the characteristics that distinguishes the pro-
fessions from other occupations.38 
Except to the extent that lawyers' clients are lawyers themselves 
( corporate house counsel, for instance), the dominance of the profes-
sion by its clients deprives lawyers of this autonomy. If nonprofes-
sionals control the work of lawyers and thus determine the 
profession's social organization, the profession will lack the power to 
draw the boundaries that separate lawyers' work from that of other 
occupations (to define "unauthorized practice of law"), to set stand-
ards of professional conduct, and thus to control the course of the 
profession. In sum, the influence of client interests may threaten the 
profession's coherence and identity. If clients' interests rather than 
professional norms determine the attitudes and behavior of lawyers, 
the profession will tend to fragment-the social integration of the 
profession will suffer. Whether or not we can properly characterize 
the state of the Chicago bar as "social disintegration," we believe 
that our research provides substantial evidence that sharp, systemati-
cally structured divisions exist within the profession. 
38. See text at note 32 supra. 
